







CENTRO STUDI LUCA D’AGLIANO 
 


















*University of Milan, Italy 
**Bocconi University, Milan, IGIER, CEPR and NBER Public Debt Management in Brazil
Alessandro Missale and Francesco Giavazzi∗
December 8, 2003
Abstract
This paper derives the optimal composition of the Brazilian public debt by looking at
the relative impact of the risk and cost of alternative debt instruments on the probability
of missing the stabilization target. This allows to price risk against the expected cost of
debt service and thus to ﬁnd the optimal combination along the trade oﬀ between cost
and risk minimization. The optimal debt structure is a function of the expected return
diﬀerentials between debt instruments, of the conditional variance of debt returns and
of their covariances with output growth, inﬂation, exchange-rate depreciation and the
Selic rate. We estimate the relevant covariances by: i) exploiting the daily survey of
expectations; ii) simulating a small structural model of the Brazilian economy under
diﬀerent shocks; iii) estimating the unanticipated components of the relevant variables
with forecasting regressions. The empirical evidence strongly supports the funding
strategy of Brazilian Treasury in 2003 of relying heavily on ﬁxed-rate LTN bonds. It
also supports its recent decision to revitalize the market for price-indexed bonds with
the new NTN-B program of IPCA indexation. Though decreasing, the exposure to
exchange rate risk appears too large suggesting that more eﬀorts should be made to
reduce funding in foreign currencies.
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There are many diﬀerent views as to the objectives of debt management but in the
case of Brazil the paramount objective of debt management should be that of reducing the
country’s ﬁscal vulnerability.1 This calls for funding at low cost but also for minimizing
the risk of large interest payments due to unexpected changes in interest rates and/or in
the exchange rate.2 Risk minimization is accomplished, as shown by Goldfajn (1998), by
choosing debt instruments which both ensure a low volatility of returns and provide a hedge
against ﬂuctuations in the primary budget, in the interest payments and in the value of the
other liabilities.
In this paper we present a simple model where debt management helps to stabilize the
debt ratio and thus reduces the probability of a debt crisis. Reducing the uncertainty of the
debt ratio, for any expected cost of debt service, is valuable in that it lowers the probability
that the ﬁscal adjustment may fail because of a bad shock to the budget.
The optimal debt composition is derived by looking at the relative impact of the risk and
cost of alternative debt instruments on the probability of missing the stabilization target.
This allows to price risk against the expected cost of debt service and thus to ﬁnd the
optimal combination along the trade oﬀ between cost and risk minimization.
The optimal debt structure is thus a function of the expected return diﬀerentials between
debt instruments, of the conditional variance of debt returns and of their covariances with
output growth, inﬂation, exchange-rate depreciation and the Selic rate. We estimate the
relevant covariances with three alternative methods. The ﬁrst approach exploits the daily
survey of expectations on GDP growth, inﬂation, the exchange rate and the Selic rate. The
second method relies on a small structural model of the Brazilian economy estimated on
monthly data for the period 1999:03-2003:07. The one-year ahead unanticipated components
of the Selic rate, the exchange rate, inﬂation and output growth are estimated as the 12-
month cumulated impulse responses of these variables to shocks to inﬂation, the output gap
and the EMBI spread. The third approach approximates the one-year ahead unanticipated
components of the relevant variables using the residuals of forecasting regressions run on
quarterly data for the period 1995:3-2003:1.
The empirical evidence suggests that a large share of the Brazilian debt should be
indexed to the price level. Price indexation should be preferred to Selic-rate indexation
while the share of dollar denominated (and indexed) bonds should be further reduced from
the current high level.3 These policy prescriptions appear robust to alternative methods
of estimating the optimal debt structure. The share of ﬁxed-rate bonds should also be
increased. Fixed-rate debt avoids large interest payments when the Selic rate rises during
a crisis or reacts to negative supply shocks and thus when debt stabilization is endangered
by slow output growth. Because of their short maturity, below two years, ﬁxed-rate bonds
1See Missale (1999) for a review of the literature on the objectives of debt management.
2see, Garcia (2002).
3For a similar conclusion in favor of price indexation see Bevilaqua and Garcia (2000). Goldfajn (1998)
also hardly ﬁnds an explanation for the high share of foreign-denominated debt.
2ensure a suﬃciently fast reduction of debt servicing costs in the event of a rapid fall in
interest rates. If the term premium required on ﬁxed-rate bonds is not too high, issuing
such bonds in exchange for Selic-rate bonds increases the probability of debt stabilization.
We provide evidence on the term premium which suggests that such a strategy is indeed
optimal.
The empirical evidence strongly supports the funding strategy of Brazilian Treasury in
2003 of relying heavily on LTN bonds. It also supports its recent decision to revitalize the
market for price-indexed bonds with the new NTN-B program of IPCA indexation. Though
decreasing, the exposure to exchange rate risk remains too large suggesting that more eﬀorts
should be made to reduce funding in foreign currencies.
2. The government problem
In this section we present a simple model where debt management helps to stabilize
the debt ratio and thus reduces the probability of a debt crisis. Debt stabilization calls for
funding at low cost but also for minimizing the risk of large payments due to unexpected
changes in interest rates and the exchange rate. Hence, the choice of debt instruments
trades oﬀ the risk and the expected cost of debt service.
Risk minimization is accomplished by choosing debt instruments which both ensure a
low return variability and provide a hedge against variations in the primary budget, in the
interest payments and in the value of the other liabilities (see e.g. Goldfajn 1998). Reducing
the uncertainty of the debt ratio, for any expected cost of debt service, is valuable in that it
lowers the probability that debt stabilization may fail because of bad shocks to the budget.
This strategy is consistent with the asset-and-liability management approach adopted by
the Brazilian Treasury (see Tesouro National 2003).
To provide insurance against variations in the primary surplus and the debt ratio, public
bonds should be indexed to nominal GDP. However, this would be a costly innovation.
Indeed, a high premium would have to be paid: for insurance; for the illiquidity of the
market and; for the delay in the release of GDP data and their revisions. Therefore, we
focus on the main funding instruments that are currently available to the Brazilian Treasury:
bonds indexed to the Selic rate (LFT), ﬁxed-rate bonds (LTN), bonds indexed to the IPG-
M price index (NTN-C) or to the IPCA index (NTN-B), domestic bonds indexed to the
US dollar and external debt denominated in foreign currency. (We refer to the latter two
instruments as dollar denominated bonds in what follows.)
The aim of the government is to stabilize the debt ratio, Bt. To this end, the govern-
ment decides a ﬁscal correction taking into account the realization of debt returns, output,
inﬂation and the exchange rate.4 However, since the result of the government’s eﬀorts is
uncertain (and the ﬁscal adjustment is costly) a crisis cannot be prevented with certainty.
Denoting the result of the ﬁscal adjustment (in terms of GDP) with At+1 −X, a debt crisis
arises if
BT
t+1 − Bt >A t+1 − X (1)
where At+1 is the expected adjustment, X, denotes the uncertain component of the ﬁscal
4T h ec h o i c eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nb em o d e l e db ya s s u m i n gt h a ti tw h e i g h st h ec o s to ft h ea d j u s t m e n t
and the probability of debt default. The formal analysis of the government problem is not carried out since
it does not aﬀect the results for debt management.
3adjustment, Bt is the debt-to-GDP ratio and BT
t+1 is the trend debt ratio, that is, the debt
ratio that would prevail in period t + 1 in the absence of the ﬁscal correction.
Alternatively, X, can be viewed as a shock to the budget that occurs after the ﬁscal
adjustment has been carried out or as a debt increase due to the discovery of hidden
liabilities –“skeletons in the closet”.
Absent government intervention the debt ratio (at market values) increases because
of the interest payments on the outstanding debt minus the trend primary surplus and
the growth of nominal GDP. The debt also increases because of the revaluation of the
dollar-denominated debt due to the depreciation of the domestic currency. Hence, debt
accumulation ∆BT
t+1 = BT
t+1 − Bt is equal to:
∆BT
t+1 = It+1Bt + ∆et+1qBt − ST
t+1 − (∆yt+1 + πt+1)Bt (2)
where It+1Bt are the nominal interest payments, et is the log of the nominal exchange rate,
q is the share dollar-denominated debt, ST
t+1 is the trend primary surplus, yt+1 is the log of
output and πt+1 is the rate of inﬂation.
The interest payments depend on the composition of public debt chosen at the end
of period t. The government can choose between bonds indexed to the Selic rate, dollar
denominated bonds, price-indexed bonds and ﬁxed-rate bonds. We take the time period as
corresponding to one year and assume that all bonds have a one-year maturity, since the
relevant decision for the Brazilian Treasury is whether 1-year ﬁxed-rate bonds should be
issued. Focusing on a one-year horizon is a reasonable approximation even if LFT, NTN and
dollar denominated bonds have much longer maturities, because the stochastic component
of their returns is dominated by movements in the Selic rate, the rate of inﬂation and the
exchange rate. Within a one-year horizon, the nominal rate of return on ﬁxed-rate 1-year
bonds is equal to the long-term interest rate, Rt, at which such bonds are issued. The
nominal return on ﬁxed-rate bonds is thus known at the time of issuance. The return in
Reais on dollar denominated bonds depends on the US interest rate, RUS
t and the risk
premium RPt and exchange rate depreciation. The nominal return on price-linked bonds
is equal to the sum of real interest rate, RI
t,k n o w na tt h et i m eo fi s s u a n c e ,a n dt h er a t e
of inﬂation, πt+1. Finally, the return on Selic-indexed bonds is determined by the path of
the Selic rate over the life of the bond and thus between period t and t +1 . T h e( a v e r a g e )
Selic rate over this period, it+1,i sn o tk n o w na tt i m et when the composition of the debt is
chosen.
The interest payments are equal to
It+1Bt = it+1sBt +( RUS
t + RPt)qBt +( RI
t + πt+1)hBt + Rt(1 − s − q − h)Bt (3)
where s is the shares of Selic-indexed debt, q is the share of dollar-denominated debt and
h is the share of price-indexed debt at the beginning of period t and where the return on
dollar denominated bonds (RUS
t +RPt)(1+∆et+1) has been approximated by RUS
t +RPt.
Finally, the ratio of the trend primary surplus to GDP, ST
t+1, is uncertain, since it
depends on cyclical conditions and on the rate of inﬂation as follows
ST
t+1 = EtST
t+1 + ηy(yt+1 − Etyt+1)+ηπ(πt+1 − Etπt+1)( 4 )
4where ηy is the semi-elasticity of the government budget (relative to GDP) with respect to
output, ηπ is the semi- elasticity of the budget with respect to the price level and Et denotes
expectations conditional on the information at time t.
Hence, the surplus-to-GDP ratio may be higher than expected because of unanticipated
output, yt+1 − Etyt+1,a n di n ﬂation, πt+1 −Etπt+1. While the impact of economic activity
on the budget is well known from a number of studies, inﬂation also reduces the deﬁcit if
tax systems and spending programs are not fully indexed.5
3. The choice of debt denomination and indexation
The objective of the Treasury is to minimize the probability that debt stabilization
fails because the adjustment eﬀort is unsuccessful; because revenues falls short of expected
and/or spending programs cannot be cut. The government chooses s, q and h to minimize






subject to (2), (3) and (4).
where φ(X) denotes the probability density function of X.
Deriving (5) with respect to s, q and h yields
Etφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1)[it+1 − Rt]=0 ( 6 )
Etφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1)[RUS
t + RPt + et+1 − et − Rt]=0 ( 7 )
Etφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1)[RI
t + πt+1 − Rt]=0 ( 8 )
where At+1−∆BT
t+1 is the planned reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio and φ(At+1−∆BT
t+1)
is a function of s, q and h.
The ﬁrst order conditions (6)-(8) have a simple interpretation: they shows that the
debt structure is optimal only if the increase in the probability of failure that is associated
with the interest cost of additional funding, in a particular type of debt, is equalized across
debt instruments. If this were not the case, the government could reduce the probability of
failure by modifying the debt structure; i.e. it could substitute ﬁxed-rate bonds for Selic-rate
indexed bonds or vice versa.6
To gain further intuition we observe that the diﬀerence between the interest cost of
Selic-indexed bonds and ﬁxed-rate bonds is equal to the diﬀerence between the (average)
Selic rate between time t and t + 1 and its value as expected at the time t, minus the term
premium on ﬁxed-rate bonds:
it+1 − Rt = it+1 − Etit+1 − TPt (9)
5in output by one percent are reported in the OECD Economic Outlook (1999) and Van der Noord (2000).
With the notable exceptions of Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, OECD countries
have elasticities in the 0.4 to 0.7 range. The eﬀects of inﬂation on government budgets have not been
measured to the same extent, but appear substantial. For Sweden, Persson, Persson and Svensson (1998)
estimate a budget improvement of 0.4% of GDP on a yearly basis for a one percent increase in the inﬂation
rate.
6The argument assumes that there are non-negative constraints to the choice of debt instruments.
5where TPt is the term premium on ﬁxed-rate bonds and where Etit+1 is the expected average
Selic rate between time t and t +1 .
Equation (9) shows that the expected cost of funding with Selic-indexed bonds is lower
than ﬁxed-rate bonds because of the term premium but, ex-post, the cost may be greater
if the Selic rate turns out to be higher than expected. It is also worth noting that equa-
tion (9) implicitly assumes that investors expectations coincides with the expectations of
the government. If this were not the case, the expected cost diﬀerential relevant for the
government, TPt, would include an informational spread:
TPt = TPI
t +( EI
t it+1 − Etit+1) (10)
where EI
t denotes investors’ expectations and TPI
t is the true term premium.
The diﬀerence between the cost of funding with dollar denominated bonds and ﬁxed-rate
bonds depends on the realization of the exchange rate. Between time t and t+1 the return
on dollar denominated bonds (evaluated in domestic currency) diﬀers from the return on
ﬁxed-rate bonds as follows
RUS
t + RPt + et+1 − et − Rt = et+1 − Etet+1 − FPt (11)
where FPt is the 1-year exchange-rate risk premium which is relevant for the government.
Although the true exchange-rate risk premium is likely to be small, dollar denominated
bonds may enjoy a liquidity premium due to the greater liquidity and eﬃciency of inter-
national bond markets. FP t may also reﬂect the diﬀerent views of the investors and the




t et+1 − Etet+1 (12)
where EI
t denotes investors’ expectations and FPI
t is the true foreign exchange risk pre-
mium.
Finally, the diﬀerence between the interest payments on price-indexed bonds and ﬁxed-
rate bonds is equal to
RI
t + πt+1 − Rt = πt+1 − Etπt+1 − IPt (13)
where IPt is the inﬂation risk premium which is relevant to the government and may include,




t πt+1 − Etπt+1 (14)
The return diﬀerentials (9)-(11)-(13) allow us to write the ﬁrst order conditions (6)-(8)
as follows
Etφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1)(it+1 − Etit+1)=TPtEtφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1) (15)
Etφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1)(et+1 − Etet+1)=FPtEtφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1) (16)
Etφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1)(πt+1 − Etπt+1)=IPtEtφ(At+1 − ∆BT
t+1) (17)
Equations (15)-(17) show the trade oﬀ between the risk and expected cost of debt service
that characterizes the choice of debt instruments.
6At the margin, the impact on the probability of debt stabilization of assuming more
risk must be equal to the impact of reducing the expected cost of debt servicing. Hence,
the marginal increase in probability can be used to price risk against the expected cost of
debt service and thus ﬁnd the optimal combination along the trade oﬀ between cost and
risk minimization. For example, equation (15) shows that issuing bonds indexed to the
Selic rate is optimal until the uncertainty of the Selic rate raises the probability of failure
as much as paying the term premium on ﬁxed-rate bonds.
Therefore, the objective of debt stabilization oﬀers a solution to the identiﬁcation of the
optimal debt structure which is independent of the government’s preferences towards risk.
This is because both the risk and the expected cost of debt service aﬀect the probability of
debt stabilization.
To derive an explicit solution for the the optimal shares of the various types of debt
we must specify the probability density function, φ(X). Since this function cannot be
estimated, we take a linear approximation of φ(X) over the range of bad realizations,
X>0, of the ﬁscal adjustment.7 This implies a triangular probability density function
equal to
φ(X)=
¯ X − X
¯ X2 (18)
where X>0a n d ¯ X is the worst possible realization of the ﬁscal adjustment.
In fact, the triangular density is the linear approximation of any density function de-
creasing with X (for X>0); it implies that bad realizations of the ﬁscal adjustment are
less likely to occur the greater is their size.
Substituting equations (18) and (2)-(4) in the ﬁrst order conditions (15)-(17) yields the








































































7We assume that the ﬁscal adjustment is expected to stabilize the debt, so that At+1 >B
T
t+1 − Bt.
7where Va r(.)a n dCov(.) denote variances and covariances conditional on the information
available at time t and Pris the probability of a debt crisis as perceived by the government.
The optimal debt shares depends on both risk and cost considerations. Risk is minimized
if a debt instrument provides insurance against variations in the primary budget and the
debt ratio due to output and inﬂation uncertainty and if the conditional variance of its
returns is relatively low. This is captured by the ﬁrst two terms in equations (19)-(21).
Equation (19) shows that ﬂoating-rate debt is optimal for risk minimization when the
Selic rate and thus the interest payments are positively correlated with unanticipated output
and inﬂation. This allows the government to pay less interests when output and inﬂation
and thus the primary surplus are unexpectedly low. More importantly, since lower output
growth tends to increase the debt ratio, instruments with returns correlated to nominal
output growth help to stabilize the debt ratio, thus reducing the risk of a debt crisis.
However, the case for indexation weakens as the conditional variance of the Selic rate
increases, thus producing unnecessary ﬂuctuations in interest payments.
Equation (20) shows that the optimal share of dollar denominated debt increases as the
exchange rate co-varies positively with output and inﬂation. If the exchange rate appre-
ciated at times of unexpectedly low output –-an unlikely event–, cyclical variations in
the government budget could be hedged by dollar denominated debt. To the extent that
exchange rate depreciation is associated with inﬂation, foreign currency debt helps to sta-
bilize the debt ratio. Clearly, exposure to exchange-rate risk becomes less attractive as the
v o l a t i l i t yo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ei n c r e a s e s .
Equation (21) shows that the optimal share of price- indexed debt increases with the co-
variance between output and inﬂation. If this covariance is positive, lower interest payments
on price-indexed debt provides an insurance against the cyclical deﬁcit due to unexpected
slowdowns in economic activity. However, inﬂation-indexed debt is optimal even if the co-
variance between output and inﬂation were zero. The reason is that price-indexed debt
provides the perfect hedge against an increase in the debt ratio due to lower than expected
nominal output growth.
Risk minimization also depends on the conditional covariances between the returns on
the various debt instruments. For instance, a positive covariance between the returns on
two types of debt makes the two instruments substitutes in the government portfolio. This
is captured by the third and fourth terms in equations (19)-(21).
Leaving aside cost considerations, the government should choose the debt composition
which oﬀers the best insurance against the risk of deﬂation and low growth. But insurance
is costly; higher expected returns are generally required on hedging instruments, and this
leads on average to greater debt accumulation. Debt stabilization thus implies a trade oﬀ
between cost and risk minimization. The eﬀect of expected return diﬀerentials (or risk
premia) on the optimal debt composition is captured by the last term in in the right-end-
side of equations (19)-(21). This term increases with the risk premia, TPt, FPt and IPt,
more precisely, with the excess return (as perceived by the government) of ﬁxed-rate bonds
relative to the instrument considered. As shown in equations (15)-(17), the impact of the
excess return on the optimal share depends on the marginal increase in the probability of
a debt crisis. The latter has been written as a function of the expected debt reduction
Et(At+1 −∆BT
t+1) and the probability of a debt crisis, Pr, as perceived by the government.
(It is worth noting, that the probability Pralso depends on the expected debt reduction, so
8that the overall eﬀect of a larger debt reduction is to reduce the impact of the expected cost
diﬀerential.) Finally, a greater variance of the return on a given debt instrument reduces
t h ei m p o r t a n c ea n dt h ei m p a c to fi n t e r e s tc o s td i ﬀerentials on its optimal share as much
as it reduces the relevance of its hedging characteristics. For example, equation (20) points
out that the share of bonds denominated or indexed to foreign currencies should increase
with the excess return, FPt. However, as the variance of the exchange rate increases, cost
considerations become less important for the choice of dollar denominated bonds.
4. Estimating the optimal debt structure
The optimal debt composition depends on the sensitivity of the primary surplus to
unexpected variations in output and inﬂation, ηy and ηπ, on the reduction in the debt ratio,
and on the probability of debt stabilization as perceived by the government. At the end of
October 2003, mainly because of lower nominal GDP growth, the net public debt was 57.2%
of GDP, one percentage point higher than in 2002. Although the debt ratio is currently
above the “optimistic” scenario presented in “Politica Economica e Reformas Estruturais”
(Ministerio da Fazenda, April 2003), the debt should stabilize next year at around 56% of
GDP. Therefore the expected debt reduction is assumed to be 1%. The probability that
the stabilization plan may fail is tentatively set at 2% which corresponds to a maximum
negative shock to the budget, ¯ X, equal to 1.5% of GDP. This scenario reﬂects the lower
interest rates associated with restored market conﬁdence as well as the high primary surplus
targeted by the government.
For the increase of the primary surplus (as a percentage of GDP) due to a 1% growth
in real GDP we rely on the estimate by Blanco and Herrera (2002) who suggest a 0.2
semi-elasticity of the primary surplus with respect to GDP (see also Bevilaqua and Wer-
neck (1997)). Evaluating the eﬀect of unexpected inﬂation on the primary surplus (as a
percentage of GDP) is a more diﬃcult task. Although the eﬀect should be substantial,
as witnessed by the remarkable budget improvement in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003, coming
down to a single number is diﬃcult.8 As indirect taxation is the main source of revenues,
these should remain roughly constant in terms of GDP. Public spending should instead fall
relative to GDP because many categories of spending remains constant in nominal terms
as set in the budget.9
Primary public spending is equal to 32% of GDP, but social security beneﬁts and other
components are linked to the inﬂation rate. This suggests a tentative estimate of the price
elasticity of the primary surplus equal to 0.2, that is, lower than the ratio of primary public
spending to GDP.
4 . 1E x p e c t e dr e t u r nd i ﬀerentials
The expected return diﬀerential between ﬁxed-rate bonds and Selic indexed bonds over
one-year horizon, TPt, is the diﬀerence between the yield at auction of ﬁxed-rate LTN bonds
and the expected return on Selic indexed LFT bonds. The latter can be estimated as the
sum of expected Selic rate from the daily survey of expectations and the discount at which
1-year LFT bonds are issued. At the end of October the average auction yield on 1-year
8The positive eﬀect of inﬂation is known as “Patinkin eﬀect” (acc. to Eliana Cardoso); it is the opposite
of the Olivera-Tanzi eﬀect.
9This information was provided by Paulo Levy at IPEA.
9LTN bonds was 17.7%, the Selic rate expected for the end of October 2004 was 14,8% and
LFT bonds were issued at a 0.4% discount. The expected return diﬀerential, TPt,c a nt h u s
be set at 2.5%.
To estimate the expected cost diﬀerential between 1-year ﬁxed-rate bonds and dollar
denominated bonds, FPt, the 1-year yield on LTN bonds must be compared to the expected
return in Reais on US$ Global bonds. At the end of October Global bonds with a 5-year
maturity have been issued at a rate of 9.45% but the yield on bonds with a 1-year to
maturity appears much lower; the yield curve shown on the Treasury website points to a
4% 1-year yield (see Tesouro Nacional 2/12/2003). On the other hand, in the same period,
the expected depreciation from the daily survey was 9.4%. With an interest rate of 17.7%
on LTNs, the expected return diﬀerential, FPt, can thus be estimated at around 4.3%.
The premium on price-linked bonds (NTN-C and NTN-B) over 1-year ﬁxed-rate bonds,
IPt,i st h es u mo fa ni n ﬂation-risk premium and, eventually, a “credibility spread” due
the higher inﬂation expected by the market than by the government. The inﬂation risk
premium can be estimated as the diﬀerence between the interest rate on LTN bonds and
the (real) yield at issue of 1-year price-linked NTN-C bonds augmented by the expected
IPG-M inﬂation. At the end of October NTN-C bonds with a 3-year maturity were issued
at 9.32% while, according to the daily survey, the expected 12-month ahead IPG-M inﬂation
was around 6.5%. This implies an inﬂation risk premium of 1.9% in October. As the real
yield on 1-year bonds might be lower than the yield on 3-year bonds, the cost advantage
of 1-year NTN-C bonds could even be greater than 1.9%. We do not add to this estimate
the diﬀerence between the inﬂation expected by the market and by the government, i.e. the
“credibility spread”, since there is no oﬃcial target for IPG-M inﬂation. It is worth noting,
however, that expected IPCA inﬂation from the daily survey was 6.2% slightly higher than
the inﬂation rate implicit in the projection of the 90th COPOM meeting of November.
4.3 Uncertainty of debt returns
The conditional variance of debt returns and their covariances with output growth and
inﬂation can be estimated from one-year ahead forecast errors of the Selic rate, inﬂation,
the exchange rate, inﬂation and output growth. Ideally, one would like to run forecasting
regressions on yearly data for such variables. Then, the residuals of the regressions could
be taken as the estimates of the one-year ahead unanticipated components of the Selic rate,
the exchange rate, inﬂation and output growth. Unfortunately, this procedure is precluded
in the case of Brazil both because time series at yearly frequency are not suﬃciently long
and, more importantly, because of the frequent regime shifts experienced over the last two
decades.
To circumvent this problem we consider the following three alternatives. The ﬁrst ap-
proach exploits the daily survey of expectations of GDP growth, inﬂation, the exchange
rate and the Selic rate. The unexpected components of these variables can be obtained as
the diﬀerence between the realization of the relevant variables and their expectations one
year earlier. The conditional covariances can then be computed as the mean of their cross
products.
The second method focuses on the most recent period of inﬂation targeting, starting
in mid 1999, and relies on a structural backward-looking model of the Brazilian economy
estimated with monthly data. The model, which is presented in the Appendix, is consistent
10with that proposed by Favero and Giavazzi (2003) under the hypothesis of “Ricardian ﬁscal
policy”. As we use monthly data, the one-year ahead unanticipated components of the
Selic rate, the exchange rate, inﬂation and output growth are estimated as the 12-month
cumulated impulse responses of these variables to shocks of inﬂation, the output gap and
the EMBI spread.
The third approach approximates the one-year ahead unanticipated components of the
relevant variables using the residuals of forecasting equations estimated on quarterly data
for the period Q3 1995 to Q1 2003.
This method requires the extension of the sample period to include the ﬁxed exchange
rate period and the currency crisis of 1999. On the other hand, the estimated stochastic
structure is independent of the modeling strategy.
5.1 Estimating the debt composition from the daily survey of expectations
Table 1 decomposes GDP growth, IPCA inﬂation, exchange-rate depreciation (relative
to the US dollar), and the Selic rate between its expected and unexpected component for
the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 for which expectations can be obtained from the daily survey.
Except for the ﬁrst year when output growth was higher than expected, the Brazilian
economy performed much worse than expected. Output growth was substantially lower in
2001, while inﬂation and exchange-rate depreciation exceeded expectations in both 2001 and
2002. The Selic rate also turned out much higher than expected. Had the government issued
ﬁxed-rate conventional bonds instead of Selic-rate indexed bonds and dollar denominated
debt, debt sustainability would not be a problem for Brazil. Hence, prima facie evidence
appears to make a strong case for ﬁxed-rate long-term debt. This depends however on
the speciﬁc —short— period considered. If times of unexpected deﬂation, falling short-term
interest rates and unexpected appreciation, as those experienced in 2003, are as likely as the
events of the period 2000-2002, then issuing ﬁxed-rate bonds paying a high term premium
would be a poor strategy.
To correctly address the issue of the optimal debt composition we must look at the
covariances of debt returns with output and inﬂation. Table 1 clearly points to a negative
correlation between all types of indexation and unexpected output growth but also shows
that unexpected inﬂation has been positively associated with higher returns on dollar-
indexed bonds and Selic-rate bonds. Unexpected inﬂation has also led to higher returns on
price-indexed bonds. This suggests a role for price-indexation (and, to a lesser extent, for the
other types of indexation) in hedging against unexpected deﬂation. This requires, however,
that the observed comovements between inﬂation and debt returns were a systematic feature
of the Brazilian economy and not just an episode conﬁned to the period under consideration.
The qualiﬁcation makes it clear that policy indications are not robust when the available
evidence is limited to a short period of time as in the present case.
The conditional covariances of debt returns with output and inﬂation (relative to the
conditional variance of returns) are presented in Table 2. The covariances of output growth
are negative but small with all types of indexed debt, while inﬂation displays a strong
positive correlation with the Selic-rate and a mild correlation with the exchange rate. Hence,
all types of indexation are useful hedges against inﬂation, although they introduce additional
risk when negative output shocks already impair debt sustainability.
Importantly, the magnitude of these eﬀects is in sharp contrast with evidence from
11OECD economies shown in Missale (2001). In the latter countries, a strong negative co-
variance between short-term interest rates and output growth is observed over the period
1970-1998 while the covariance between short-term rates and inﬂation is small and not
signiﬁcant. Only Greece, Portugal and Sweden display a correlation between short-term
rates and inﬂation as strong as in Brazil. This fact can be explained by the speciﬁcs h o c k s
experienced by the Brazilian economy during the short period considered. However, these
correlations could also reﬂect structural features of the economy and/or the need for a more
ﬂexible approach to inﬂation targeting in emerging economies exposed to large shocks. In
particular, the low correlation of output with the policy rate may reﬂect a lower elasticity
of the output gap to such rate or the case for a smoother convergence of the inﬂation rate
to the target. Quoting the Open Letter sent by Banco Central do Brasil’s Governor to the
Minister of Finance (January 2003): “It is a standard practice among Central Banks when
facing supply shocks of great magnitude to postpone the convergence of current inﬂation
towards the targets over a longer period, avoiding unnecessary costs to the economy. This
was the case faced by Brazil in the last year.”
As the positive correlation of the Selic rate and the exchange rate with inﬂation domi-
nates their negative but small correlation with output growth, bonds indexed to the Selic-
rate, inﬂation and the exchange rate all provide some insurance against variations in the
primary surplus and the debt ratio due to unexpected changes in nominal output growth.
This is shown in the ﬁrst Column of Table 3, which reports for each type of debt the opti-
mal share for risk minimization in the case we abstract from hedging against variations in
the interest payments of the other instruments. All shares are positive reﬂecting the same
distribution of the returns of variable-rate instruments.
Column 2 shows the debt composition that allows to minimize both the risk of variations
in the primary surplus and in the interest payments. As Selic-indexed, price-indexed and
dollar denominated bonds are close substitutes in the government portfolio, variations in
their interest payments should be hedged by holding a long position in Selic-indexed bonds
(for example by means of foreign currency swaps).
When cost considerations are introduced into the analysis, the composition of the debt
clearly moves in favor of price-indexed bonds. Column 3 shows that the government should
issue price-indexed bonds in amount far exceeding the total debt and hedge this position by
holding assets denominated in dollars, along with Selic-indexed bonds. This result may look
surprising given the cost advantage, 2.3%, of dollar denominated bonds over price-indexed
bonds, but it is worth recalling that expected return diﬀerentials must be normalized by the
conditional variance or returns and the standard deviation of exchange-rate depreciation
has been 3.6 times that of inﬂation. Since for practical reasons a structure of assets and
liabilities as shown in Column 3 is clearly unfeasible, in Column 4 the share of price-indexed
bonds is estimated in the case the government cannot hold Selic-indexed bonds. The case
for price indexed bonds is again strong.
Evidence from the daily survey of expectations thus suggests price indexation as the
optimal strategy for debt management, thus supporting the policy indications by Bevilaqua
and Garcia (2000). As bonds indexed to the price level currently represent less than 15%
of the domestic marketable federal debt (in the hands of the public) this would imply that
funding in the next few years will have to rely on price indexation. It is however important to
realize the risk of a strategy that increases the exposure of the government budget to unex-
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to insure against the impact of unanticipated output slowdowns on debt sustainability. As
highlighted in the discussion above, the fact that such shocks have played a minor role
compared to variations in the exchange rate and inﬂation over the period considered does
not mean that they will continue to do so in the future. A debt structure that comprises
ﬁxed-rate conventional bonds along with price-indexed bonds would better balance the risks
that the Brazilian economy may face in the years ahead.
In order to examine whether and how the optimal debt composition depends on the
types of shocks hitting the economy, in the next Section we present results for diﬀerent
shocks identiﬁed with a structural model of the Brazilian economy.
5.2 Estimating the debt composition with a structural model
The structural model used to estimate the optimal debt composition is made of ﬁve
equations for: (i) the inﬂation rate; (ii) the output gap; (iii) the Selic rate; (iv) the exchange
rate and; (v) the EMBI spread.
The model is estimated on monthly data for the period 1999:3-2003:7 and is presented in
the Appendix. We consider three types of shocks: a supply shock (in the inﬂation equation),
a demand shock (in the output-gap equation) and a shock to the EMBI spread. Then, we
compute the 12-months cumulated impulse responses of the Selic rate, the exchange rate,
inﬂation and output for 1000 extractions from the distribution of each type of shock.10 The
cumulated responses are then used to estimate the ratios of conditional covariances relative
to conditional variances which are shown in Tables 4, 6 and 8 for the demand shock, the
supply shock and the EMBI shock, respectively. The optimal debt composition is reported
in Tables 5 7 and 9 for each type of shock.
5.2.1 Demand shocks
Table 5 shows the debt composition that stabilizes the debt ratio against demand shocks
-i.e. against shocks to the output gap equation. The ﬁrst Column of Table 5 reports the
shares of each type of debt which are optimal for minimizing the risk of variations in the
primary surplus and the debt ratio, that is, when we abstract from hedging against variations
in the interest payments (or returns) of the other instruments. The shares of Selic and price
indexed bonds are positive and exceed several times the total debt. This evidence suggests
that such instruments oﬀer a valuable insurance against variations in the primary surplus
and in the debt ratio. As demand shocks induce a positive covariance of output and inﬂation
and a strong reaction of the policy rate, the returns on both Selic and price indexed bonds
are strongly correlated with output and inﬂation. As the monetary reaction leads to an
appreciation of the exchange rate, the return on dollar denominated bonds is negatively
correlated with both output and inﬂation. This explains the large negative share of dollar
denominated debt; the government should rather hold foreign assets to hedge against output
shocks.
Column 2 shows the debt composition that minimizes risk when we consider, along
with budget and debt-ratio uncertainty, the role of each instrument in hedging against the
returns of the other instruments. Since Selic and price indexed bonds are close substitutes
10For the exchange rate the response at the 12th month was used instead of the cumulated responses.
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The long position in foreign assets also decrease as Selic and price indexed bonds are hedged
by dollar denominated bonds.
The risk minimizing debt structure calls for issuing large amounts of indexed instruments
to fund unlimited holdings of foreign assets. Since taking such position is clearly unfeasible,
in Column 3 we restrict the shares of dollar denominated debt and ﬁxed rate debt to be
non-negative. In this case, risk minimization clearly favors price indexation over Selic rate
indexation.
The optimal debt composition does not change when cost minimization is considered
along with risk insurance. Column 4 shows that both Selic rate and price indexed bonds
should be issued if large holdings of foreign assets were feasible. However, when the debt
shares are constrained to be non-negative price indexation clearly emerges as the optimal
choice: Column 5 shows that all the debt should be indexed to the price level.
5.2.2 Supply shocks
Table 7 shows the optimal debt composition that stabilizes the debt ratio against supply
shocks, i.e. against shocks to the inﬂation equation. Column 1 shows that ﬁxed-rate bonds,
Selic rate and price indexed bonds, all provide insurance against variations in the primary
surplus and in the debt ratio due to lower than expected inﬂation and output growth. In
particular, more than one third of the debt should be at ﬁx e dr a t ew h i l et h eo t h e rt w o
thirds should be indexed to the Selic rate and the price level. Although, Selic-rate and
price indexed bonds are good hedges against lower than expected inﬂation, they provide
limited insurance against budget risk, since their returns are now negatively correlated with
output (see Table 6). Since supply shocks lead to a negative covariance of output with both
inﬂation and the Selic rate, ﬁxed-rate debt helps to stabilize the debt ratio.
Column 2 shows that, when we consider the risk of variations in debt returns along with
budget risk and debt-ratio uncertainty, a role emerges for dollar denominated bonds. The
optimal composition for risk minimization comprises a small share of dollar denominated
bonds and a negative share of Selic indexed bonds. The reason is that, even if dollar de-
nominated bonds are poor hedges against variations in the primary surplus, they help to
stabilize the interest payments on price indexed bonds. This is because, the exchange rate
covaries negatively with inﬂation; it appreciates when the Selic rate is raised to counter neg-
ative supply shocks. Since Selic indexed bonds are close substitutes for price indexed bonds
but oﬀer a limited insurance against inﬂation uncertainty, their share becomes negative. By
contrast, ﬁxed-rate bonds still appear to play an important role in risk minimization; about
one fourth of the debt should be at ﬁxed rate.
Although ﬁxed-rate debt helps to stabilize the debt ratio by insulating the budget from
supply shocks, its higher expected cost has a negative impact on the probability of stabiliza-
tion. Columns 3 shows the debt composition that maximizes the probability of stabilizing
the debt ratio when cost considerations are taken into account. Since variable-rate bonds
have lower expected returns than ﬁxed-rate bonds, their shares increase substantially leav-
ing no role for ﬁxed-rate bonds; it would even be optimal to hold ﬁxed-rate assets and fund
this position with the other instruments. Finally, Column 4 shows that, when the opti-
mal shares are constrained to be non-negative, there is a strong case for price-indexation;
more than 80% of the debt should be indexed to the price level with the remaining part
14denominated in dollars.
The lack of ﬁxed-rate bonds in the optimal debt structure is partly explained by the
strong complementarity between price-indexed and dollar denominated bonds which arises
because of the exchange rate appreciation that follows an inﬂation shock. If we abstract
from the hedge provided by dollar debt against the returns of the other instruments, issuing
some ﬁxed-rate debt is optimal. Column 5 shows that, in this case, ﬁxed-rate bonds still
account for 16% of the debt in spite of their higher expected return. This case could be
relevant if negative supply shocks, by inducing a deterioration of the ﬁscal position (that our
model fails to capture), led to a greater EMBI spread and a depreciation of the exchange
rate. The eﬀects of shocks to the country risk premium are discussed in the next section.
5.2.3 EMBI shocks
Tables 9 shows the debt composition that stabilizes the debt ratio against shocks to the
EMBI spread. Changes in the country risk premium may capture changes in international
risk factors or in the perception of risk as well as domestic ﬁscal shocks, for example,
negative shocks to the budget that increase country risk.
The ﬁrst Column of Table 9 reports the debt composition that stabilizes the debt ratio
against variations in output and inﬂation, that is, in the case we abstract from hedging
against variations in the interest payments. The shares of Selic indexed bonds and dollar
denominated bonds are negative, reﬂecting the strong negative covariances of their returns
with output growth that are shown in Table 8. In fact, EMBI shocks also lead to both
unexpected inﬂation and exchange-rate depreciation, but the negative covariances of the
Selic rate and the exchange rate with output dominate their positive covariances with
inﬂation. It follows that ﬁxed-rate bonds should be issued in amounts exceeding the total
debt so as to insulate the budget from unexpected output contractions.
Column 2 shows that issuing ﬁxed-rate debt is still optimal for risk minimization when
we consider the role of each instrument in hedging the returns of the other instruments.
The government should issue an amount of ﬁxed-rate bonds larger than the total debt and
hold both foreign assets and Selic indexed bonds. When, as in Column 4, the debt shares
are constrained to be non-negative, the share of ﬁxed-rate debt reaches 93%.
When cost considerations are introduced into the analysis, as in Column 4 an 5, the
optimal debt composition moves towards price indexation, but the share of ﬁxed-rate bonds
remains substantial despite their higher expected return. Column 5 shows that, when debt
shares are constrained to be non-negative, the optimal share of ﬁxed-rate bonds is as high
as 82%.
5.2.4 Policy conclusions from the structural model
Results from the structural model suggest that a large share of the Brazilian debt should
be indexed to the price level. Price indexed bonds appear to consistently provide a good
hedge against all types of shocks, although their role is limited in the case of EMBI shocks.
Indexation to the Selic rate should be avoided if supply shocks and EMBI shocks prevail
while LFT bonds are a worse alternative to price indexation in the case of demand shocks.
Importantly, there appears to be little role for dollar denominated bonds. Exposure to
exchange rate risk should be avoided in case of demand shocks and EMBI shocks while it
should be limited in the case of supply shocks. In particular, the greater volatility of the
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bonds their expected return diﬀerential should be much higher than that currently observed.
Whether 1-year ﬁxed-rate bonds should be issued depends on the type of shocks hitting
the economy. While ﬁxed-rate LTN bonds have no role in the case of demand shocks, they
are the best instruments to cope with shocks to the country risk premium. If EMBI shocks
prevail, a share of such bonds substantially higher than that currently observed would be
optimal even after considering their greater expected cost. LTN bonds may also provide
insurance against variations in the primary budget and the debt ratio induced by supply
shocks, but their optimal share is small because of their higher expected return. A stronger
argument for ﬁxed-rate bonds (in exchange for dollar denominated bonds) can be made if
negative supply shocks increase ﬁscal vulnerability, thus leading to a depreciation of the
exchange rate.
These policy implications obviously depend on the correct speciﬁcation of the struc-
tural model. It is thus important to check whether they continue to hold under diﬀerent
estimation methods.
5.3 Estimating the debt composition with forecasting equations
In this section the conditional covariances of debt returns, output and inﬂation are
estimated using the residuals of forecasting equations run on quarterly data for the period
Q3 1995 to Q1 2003. We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst run regressions of output, inﬂation,
the exchange rate and the Selic rate separately on one lag of each variable and take the
residuals as an estimate of the unanticipated component of the dependent variable. Then,
we estimate the ratio of the conditional covariance between, say, output and inﬂation to
the variance of inﬂation as the coeﬃcients of the regression of the residuals of output on
the residuals of inﬂation obtained in the ﬁrst stage.
Table 10 shows that these ratios are small and not statistically signiﬁcant except for the
negative covariance of the Selic rate with output. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results
from the structural model in the case of supply shocks and shocks to the EMBI spread:
unexpected increases in the Selic rate appear to be associated with signiﬁcant reductions
in output growth. On the other hand, the Selic rate does not bear any systematic relation
with unexpected inﬂation. The conditional covariance between inﬂation and output (and
thus between the returns on price-indexed bonds and output) is negative but small and
not signiﬁcant. The exchange rate also appears to be uncorrelated with both output and
inﬂation over the period considered.
Table 11 presents the optimal debt composition. Column 1 reports the shares of the
various types of debt which are optimal for risk minimization, that is, in the case that all
bonds had the same expected return. Column 2 does the same when the debt composition
is computed using only the covariance/variance ratios that are statistically signiﬁcant. Col-
umn 1 and 2 show that, for the purpose of minimizing risk, all the debt should be indexed
to the price level. While dollar denominated bonds play no role, the government should
hold assets indexed to the Selic-rate and fund this position with ﬁxed-rate bonds. This
is probably the result of including the 1999 currency crisis into the sample. Indeed, the
negative and large share of Selic-indexed bonds reﬂects the negative covariance between
output and the policy rate that characterizes crisis events. This evidence suggests that a
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this is less desirable; i.e. at times of output contractions and when credit availability is a
problem.
Although the share of ﬁxed-rate debt in Column 1 and 2 is substantial, such debt is used
to fund the long position in Selic-indexed bonds. If the share of Selic debt is constrained
to be non-negative as in Column 3, then ﬁxed-rate bonds should not be issued. Hence,
price-indexed bonds appear the optimal choice for risk minimization. This is because their
returns are unrelated to output ﬂuctuations and provide a natural hedge against lower than
expected inﬂation.11
Then, the interesting issue is whether diﬀerences in expected returns imply a role for
Selic-rate bonds and dollar denominated bonds in debt stabilization. The optimal debt
shares are shown in Column 4. Cost diﬀerentials make it optimal to issue larger amounts of
indexed and dollar denominated bonds in exchange for ﬁxed-rate debt. However, the share
of Selic-indexed bonds remains negative while that of dollar denominated debt is positive
but small. Since price-indexd bonds should be issued in amounts exceeding the total debt,
Column 4 also shows a long, though small, position in ﬁxed-rate bonds. Since these large
asset holdings are clearly unfeasible, Column 6 shows the optimal debt composition when
the shares of Selic indexed bonds and ﬁxed-rate bonds are constrained to be non negative.
The case for price indexation is again strong; almost the whole debt should be indexed to
the price level.
Therefore, results from forecasting equations strengthen our previous conclusions: price
indexation should be preferred to Selic-rate indexation while the share of dollar denominated
(and indexed) bonds should be drastically reduced from the current high level. Indeed,
the lack of correlation of the Selic-rate with inﬂation and its negative covariance with
economic activity provide strong evidence against Selic-rate indexation. This risk-return
characteristics may have changed with the monetary regime and/or reﬂect the particular
events covered by the sample period.
However, if the observed negative correlation between the Selic rate and economic activ-
ity were due to the 1999 currency crisis, policy indications against ﬂoating rate debt would
even be stronger.
The results of forecasting regressions strongly support the decision of the Brazilian
Treasury to revitalize the market for price-indexed bonds. It is however worth recalling
that the simulations of the structural model presented in the previous section suggest that
ﬁxed-rate bonds are better instruments than price-indexed bonds to cope with shocks to
the EMBI spread.
Even if we restrict the attention to the results of forecasting regressions there are sev-
eral reasons why indexing a large share of debt to the price level may not be optimal or
feasible. For instance, while we focus on 1-year bonds, NTN-C and NTN-B bonds are is-
sued at longer maturities, probably, reﬂecting the preferred holding periods of institutional
investors. Issuing 5- to 20-year bonds at a real 10% interest rate may not be advisable
if the ﬁscal authorities were determined to carry out the ﬁscal stabilization. In this case
issuing ﬁxed-rate bonds with a one-year maturity would be a more eﬀective strategy for
11Note that the debt composition that is optimal for risk minimization does not depend on the covariances
between the returns on the various types of debt, that is, on complementarities and substitutabilities between
debt instruments.
17cost minimization (at the cost of increasing the exposure to roll-over risk.)
Secondly, it is likely that the amount of price-indexed bonds that the market is willing
to absorb at current interest rates is limited. If the government placed increasing amounts
of such debt its interest rate would rise. The extent of indexation may also be limited by
reasons of political opportunity: inﬂation indexation of interest income may give rise to
pressures for extending indexation to other types of income. Moreover, it is often argued
that indexation reduces the cost of inﬂation and thus the incentives for anti-inﬂationary
ﬁscal and monetary policy. Fixed-rate debt may also enhance the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy in controlling aggregate demand (see Falcetti and Missale 2002). Finally, issuance of
ﬁxed-rate conventional bonds can be motivated by the objective of developing a domestic
market for ﬁxed-rate bonds.
It is worth examining under which conditions substituting ﬁxed-rate 1-year bonds for
dollar denominated bonds and for Selic-rate bonds is optimal, while taking the shares of
the other types of debt constant at the current level. Table 12 shows (for various pairs of
the expected debt reduction and the probability that debt stabilization fails) the interest
rate diﬀerential between 1-year ﬁxed-rate bonds and dollar denominated bonds, FP,b e l o w
which it is optimal to issue ﬁxed-rate bonds in exchange for dollar denominated bonds.
Since the current exposure to exchange rate risk (after swaps), considering the net external
debt, is currently as high as 40%, substituting ﬁxed-rate bonds for foreign currency debt
would be optimal even for a very high perceived probability that debt stabilization may fail.
For instance, with the current 4.3% expected return diﬀerential the exposure to exchange
rate risk would be optimal only if the perceived probability of failure were as high as 40%.
Table 13 shows the interest rate diﬀerential between 1-year ﬁxed-rate bonds and Selic-
indexed bonds, TP, below which issuing ﬁxed-rate bonds in exchange for Selic-indexed
bonds is optimal. With an expected debt reduction equal to 2% of GDP, and 6% probability
that the debt ratio would not stabilize, ﬁxed-rate bonds should replace Selic-indexed bonds
as soon as the term premium falls below 2.8%. However, if the probability of failure were
lower, say 3%, then ﬁxed-rate bonds should be issued even if the term premium were as
high as 4.6%. Although, these numbers should be regarded as just indicative, they show
the large scope for improvement in the composition of the Brazilian debt.
6. Policy conclusions
In this paper we have presented a framework for the choice of debt instruments that is
relevant for countries where ﬁscal vulnerability makes debt stabilization the main goal of
debt management.
The optimal debt composition has been estimated by looking at the relative impact
of the risk and cost of various debt instruments on the probability that the government
might miss the stabilization target, which we have deﬁned as a pre-assigned level of the
debt-to-GDP ratio.
The empirical evidence suggests that a large share of the Brazilian debt should be
indexed to the price level. Price-indexed bonds appear to consistently provide a good hedge
against all types of shocks, although their role is limited in the case of EMBI shocks. Price
indexation should be preferred to Selic-rate indexation, and the share of dollar denominated
(and indexed) bonds should be drastically reduced. These policy prescriptions are robust
18to alternative methods of estimating the optimal debt structure.
Fixed-rate LTN bonds also help to stabilize the debt ratio. Although such bonds have
no role in the case of demand shocks, they are the best instruments to cope with shocks to
the country risk premium. If EMBI shocks prevail, a share of ﬁxed-rate bonds substantially
higher than that currently observed would be optimal even after considering their greater
expected cost. Fixed-rate bonds can also provide insurance against ﬂuctuations in the
primary budget and in the debt ratio induced by supply shocks, but their optimal share
should be smaller than that of price-indexed bonds because of their higher expected return.
The scope for improving on the current structure of the Brazilian debt is substantial.
The composition of the net public debt in Brazil is strongly biased toward debt denominated
or indexed to foreign currencies. Once we account for net external debt and for the foreign
currency swaps of the Central Bank, the exposure to the exchange rate reaches 40%. The
share of debt indexed to the Selic rate is also as high as 40%. By contrast the share of debt
indexed to the price level is slightly above 10% and the ﬁxed-rate component is about 8%.
These facts suggest simple policy prescriptions. First of all, the exposure to exchange
rate risk should be reduced. The cost advantage of bonds denominated or indexed to foreign
currency is not suﬃcient to compensate for the high risk of variations in the exchange rate.
The exposure to the exchange rate is so high that betting in the direction of a further
appreciation of the exchange rate is highly risky. One of the reasons such a large share of
the domestic debt is indexed to the dollar is the demand for hedge by the private sector.
I nB r a z i lt h eo n l ye n t i t i e st h a tb e a re x c h a n g er a t er i s ka r et h eg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h eC e n t r a l
Bank: the private sector fully hedges its dollar exposure by entering into swap contracts with
the Central Bank. Such a large amount of outstanding hedge cannot be rapidly reduced:
the currency falls sharply whenever the Central Bank announces that it will not fully roll
over the outstanding stock of hedge. The current account surplus that Brazil is now running
oﬀers an opportunity to reduce the demand for hedge by the private sector. This constraints,
however, does not apply to Treasury funding in foreign currencies, which should be avoided,
thus reducing exchange rate exposure at least on this front. Since vulnerability to exchange
rate risk is valued by investors, a smaller share of dollar denominated debt could lower the
risk premium on the Brazilian debt.
The second advice is to increase issuance of price-indexed bonds. Price indexation,
especially the new IPCA indexation program, provides a natural hedge against the impact
of inﬂation on both the primary surplus and the debt ratio. In the perspective of the asset-
and-liability management approach of the Brazilian Treasury, NTN-C and NTN-B bonds do
not only match future revenues but also the risks of price indexed assets in the government
portfolio (see Ministerio de Fazenda 2003). Since NTN-C bonds have a long maturity, they
also insulates the government budget from roll-over risk, thus representing an important
factor of stability for public debt dynamics. Thus, the decision of the Brazilian Treasury to
revitalize the market for price-indexed bonds ﬁnds a strong support in our analysis.
How large the share of price-indexed bonds should be, is more diﬃcult to say. Although
our analysis suggests that such a share should be large, there are a number of reasons why
this may not be optimal or feasible. The amount of price indexed bonds that could be
issued may be limited by reasons of political opportunity or by the likely increase in the
expected return that investors require to hold such bonds when their share increases.
The main obstacle against a strategy of price indexation lies, however, in the long
19maturity of price-indexed bonds, that would lock in the cost of debt service at real interest
rates as high as 10% for many years ahead. In fact, this could be too high a cost for a
government fully determined to carry out the ﬁscal stabilization.
A role for nominal debt instruments of short duration emerges if the stabilization pro-
gram does not enjoy full credibility and long-term interest are too high relative to govern-
ment expectations of future rates. The decision of the Treasury to rely on bonds indexed
to the Selic rate clearly ﬁnds a strong motivation in this argument; ﬂoating-rate LFT debt
ensures that a fall in interest rates would be immediately transmitted into a lower debt
service cost. Although our analysis cannot capture such an eﬀect, it points to ﬁxed-rate
bonds with a one-year maturity as an attractive alternative to Selic-rate indexation.
Indeed, the third policy indication that emerges from this paper is to substitute ﬁxed-
rate bonds for bonds indexed to the Selic rate. Fixed-rate debt avoids large interest pay-
ments when the Selic rate rises during a crisis or reacts to negative supply shocks and thus
when debt stabilization is endangered by slow output growth. We ﬁnd evidence that issu-
ing ﬁxed-rate bonds in exchange for Selic-indexed bonds increases the probability of debt
stabilization even if the 12-month term premium is as high as 4%. Since realistically the
maturity of ﬁxed-rate bonds will have to remain relatively short, within two years, a greater
share of such bonds would not preclude the beneﬁt of a fall in interest rates.
Issuance of ﬁxed-rate bonds can bring additional beneﬁts as they play a key role in
the creation of a domestic bond market. The resumption in 2003 of LTN auctions for
maturities longer than one year goes in the right direction. The Treasury should commit to
this strategy by announcing a regular program of ﬁxed-rate bond auctions, since the success
of this strategy hinges on the market perception that the program will not be changed or
interrupted because of unfavorable market conditions.
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21Table 1 - Economic Indicators
Realized
π ∆y ∆e Selic
2000 5.97 4.4 9.3 15.84
2001 7.67 1.4 18.7 19.05
2002 12.53 1.5 52.3 24.90
Unanticipated
π ∆y ∆e Selic
2000 -1.03 1.4 0.3 -0.81
2001 3.37 -2.6 16.4 5.05
2002 7.73 -0.9 26.0 7.90
Notes: IPCA inﬂation, US dollar exchange-rate depreciation,
end-of-period Selic rate
Table 2 - Covariances from Survey of Expectations
Cov(yi)/V ar(i) -0.24 Cov(iπ)/V ar(i) 0.89
Cov(ye)/V ar(e) -0.07 Cov(eπ)/V ar(e) 0.27
Cov(yπ)/V ar(π) -0.24 Cov(eπ)/V ar(π) 3.55
Va r(i) 0.30 Cov(ie)/V ar(i) 3.25
Va r(e) 3.15 Cov(ie)/V ar(e) 0.30
Va r(π) 0.24 Cov(iπ)/V ar(π) 1.09
Notes: Variances are multiplied by 100.Table 3 - Debt Composition from Survey of Expectations
Risk Risk Risk+Cost Risk+Cost
No hedge Fix=Selic=0
Selic Rate 0.88 -4.14 -1.80 0
Foreign Exchange 0.27 0.73 -0.12 0.01
Price Index 1.03 2.98 2.61 0.99
Fixed Rate -1.18 1.43 0.08 0
Notes: The debt composition is derived from equations (19)-(21).
23Table 4 - Covariances - Structural Model - Demand Shock
Cov(yi)/V ar(i) 12.9 Cov(iπ)/V ar(i) 0.76
Cov(ye)/V ar(e) -10.7 Cov(eπ)/V ar(e) -0.63
Cov(yπ)/V ar(π) 11.3 Cov(eπ)/V ar(π) -0.70
Va r(i) 0.038 Cov(ie)/V ar(i) -0.80
Va r(e) 0.054 Cov(ie)/V ar(e) -0.56
Va r(π) 0.049 Cov(iπ)/V ar(π) 0.58
Notes: Variances are multiplied by 1002.
Table 5 - Debt Composition for Demand Shock
Risk Risk Risk Risk+Cost Risk+Cost
No hedge Fix=For=0 Fix=For=0
Selic Rate 18.4 7.5 -3.3 8.3 -3.2
Foreign Exch -15.3 -6.2 0 -5.1 0
Price Index 16.6 7.9 4.3 8.3 4.2
Fixed Rate -18.6 -8.1 0 -10.5 0
Notes: The debt composition is derived from equations (19)-(21).
24Table 6 - Covariances - Structural Model - Supply Shock
Cov(yi)/V ar(i) -0.42 Cov(iπ)/V ar(i) 0.64
Cov(ye)/V ar(e) 0.33 Cov(eπ)/V ar(e) -0.57
Cov(yπ)/V ar(π) -0.53 Cov(eπ)/V ar(π) -1.23
Va r(i) 0.109 Cov(ie)/V ar(i) -0.96
Va r(e) 0.172 Cov(ie)/V ar(e) -0.61
Va r(π) 0.079 Cov(iπ)/V ar(π) 0.89
Notes: Variances are multiplied by 1002.
Table 7 - Debt Composition for Supply Shock
Risk Risk Risk+Cost Risk+Cost Risk+Cost
No hed Fix=Sel=0 No oth
Selic Rate 0.30 -0.26 0.03 0 0.37
Foreign Exchange -0.32 0.06 0.54 0.18 -0.24
Price Index 0.63 0.89 1.35 0.82 0.71
Fixed Rate 0.38 0.26 -0.92 0 0.16
Notes: The debt composition is derived from equations (19)-(21).
25Table 8 - Covariances - Structural Model - EMBI Shock
Cov(yi)/V ar(i) -2.14 Cov(iπ)/V ar(i) 1.50
Cov(ye)/V ar(e) -0.38 Cov(eπ)/V ar(e) 0.27
Cov(yπ)/V ar(π) -0.95 Cov(eπ)/V ar(π) 1.65
Va r(i) 0.038 Cov(ie)/V ar(i) 3.71
Va r(e) 1.187 Cov(ie)/V ar(e) 0.12
Va r(π) 0.194 Cov(iπ)/V ar(π) 0.30
Notes: Variances are multiplied by 1002.
Table 9 - Debt Composition for EMBI Shock
Risk Risk Risk Risk+Cost Risk+Cost
No hed Sel=For=0 Selic=For=0
Selic Rate -0.86 -1.24 0 -0.79 0
Foreign Exchange -0.15 -0.22 0 -0.25 0
Price Index 0.07 0.80 0.07 0.76 0.11
Fixed Rate 1.95 1.66 0.93 1.28 0.89
Notes: The debt composition is derived from equations (19)-(21).
26Table 10 - Covariances - Forecasting Regression
Cov(yi)/V ar(i) -0.536 Cov(iπ)/V ar(i) -0.016
(0.002) (0.93)
Cov(ye)/V ar(e) 0.018 Cov(eπ)/V ar(e) -0.017
(0.38) (0.45)
Cov(yπ)/V ar(π) -0.042 Cov(eπ)/V ar(π) -1.170
(0.81) (0.45)
Va r(i) 0.012 Cov(ie)/V ar(i) -2.166
(0.19)
Va r(e) 0.899 Cov(ie)/V ar(e) -0.027
(0.19)
Va r(π) 0.013 Cov(iπ)/V ar(π) -0.014
(0.93)
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Quarterly data. Variances are multiplied by 100.
Table 11 - Debt Composition - Forecasting Regressions
Risk Risk Risk Risk+Cost Risk+Cost
Signiﬁcant Selic=0 Signiﬁcant Fix=Selic=0
Selic Rate -0.72 -0.73 0 -0.42 0
Foreign Exch 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.01 0.01
Price Index 1.30 1.36 1.35 1.56 0.99
Fixed Rate 0.42 0.37 -0.35 -0.15 0
Notes: The debt composition is derived assuming a that the 1-year ahead conditional vari-
ances are four times the 3-month ahead conditional variances.
27Table 12 - Cut-oﬀ Exchange-Rate Risk Premium
Fixed Rate for Foreign Exchange
Debt− ratio expected reduction
Prob Fail 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0%
20% 18,9 23,7 31,6 47,4
25% 13,5 16,8 22,5 33,7
30% 9,4 11,8 15,8 23,7
35% 6,3 7,9 10,6 15,9
40% 3,8 4,8 6,4 9,6
Notes: Risk premium in percent.
Table 13 - Cut-oﬀ Term Premium
Fixed Rate for Selic Rate
Debt− ratio expected reduction
Prob Fail 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0%
2% 4,80 6,00 8,01 12,0
3% 3,70 4,63 6,17 9,25
4% 3,04 3,81 5,07 7,61
5% 2,60 3,25 4,33 6,49
6% 2,27 2,83 3,78 5,66
Notes: Risk premium in percent.
28Appendix
The model used in the simulation exercises to obtain the impulse responses to supply,
demand and Embi spread shocks is made of the following equations:
Embi Spread equation
Embit = µ0 + µ1Embit−1 + µ2Bt−1it−1 + µ3SpBaat + µ4DU + vembit (1)
where Embit is the Embi spread, SpBaa is the US Corporate bond spread and DU
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the crisis period 2002:06 -2002:12.
Exchange rate equation
et = δ0 + δ1et−1 + δ2(it−1 − i
US
t−1)+δ3Embit + δ4∆Embit + vet (2)
where iUS is the US federal funds rate.
Output gap equation
yt = γ0 + γ1yt−1 + γ2yt−2 + γ3it−6 + γ4Embit−1 + vyt (3)
Inﬂation equation
πt = α0 + α1πt−1 + α2yt−1 + α3(et−6 − et−12)+α4Σ
4
i=1Embit−i + vπt (4)
Selic rate equation
it = ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)[β0 + β1(πt−1 − π
T)+β2∆et−4]+vit (5)
where πT is the inﬂation target.
The inﬂation rate, the interest rates, the spreads and the output gap are monthly
and have not been multiplied by 100. The exchange rate et is the logarithm of the
$Real/US-dollar exchange rate. An Embi spread shock is a one standard deviation
shock to equation (1), a demand shock is a one standard deviation shock to equation
(3) and a supply shock is a one standard deviation shock to equation (4).
The model is estimated by Iterative Least Squares.
1Table A1 - Estimated Model, sample 1999:03 2003:07
Coeff S.E. t − ratio Adj.R2 SEeq. DW
SEdep.va
µ0 -0.132 0.182 -0.72 0.85 0.156 2.01
0.406
µ1 0.254 0.114 2.23
µ2 19.78 11.22 1.76
µ3 187.8 68.34 2.75
µ4 0.618 0.116 5.32
δ0 0.032 0.021 1.53 0.97 0.036 1.95
0.249
δ1 0.977 0.032 30.2
δ2 -2.724 1.010 -2.69
δ3 0.044 0.019 2.23
δ4 0.215 0.028 7.47
γ0 0.037 0.013 2.79 0.40 0.020 1.77
0.026
γ1 0.465 0.173 2.68
γ2 -0.244 0.162 -1.50
γ3 -1.452 0.680 -2.13
γ4 -0.020 0.007 -2.56
α0 -0.0005 0.0002 -2.04 0.98 0.0004 1.44
0.0028
α1 0.9470 0.0370 25.0
α2 0.0077 0.0039 1.99
α3 0.0017 0.0005 3.42
α4 0.0002 0.00004 5.97
ρ 0.866 0.034 24.9 0.94 0.0006 1.04
0.0025
β0 0.012 0.001 10.1
β1 1.569 0.394 3.97
β2 0.025 0.013 1.97
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